Scientific Teams and Institutional Collaborations: Evidence from U.S. Universities, 1981-1999 by Adams, James D. et al.
Research Policy 34 (2005) 259–285
Scientific teams and institutional collaborations: Evidence from
U.S. universities, 1981–1999
James D. Adams a,∗, Grant C. Black b, J. Roger Clemmons c, Paula E. Stephand
a Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and NBER, 3504 Russell Sage Laboratory, Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA
b Indiana University at South Bend, USA
c Institute for Child Health Policy, University of Florida, USA
d Georgia State University, USA
Received 6 August 2004; received in revised form 29 December 2004; accepted 16 January 2005
Available online 23 March 2005
Abstract
This paper explores recent trends in the size of scientific teams and in institutional collaborations. The data derive from 2.4
million scientific papers written in 110 top U.S. research universities over the period 1981–1999. The top 110 account for a large
share of published basic research conducted in the U.S. during this time.
We measure team size by the number of authors on a scientific paper. Using this measure we find that team size increases by
50% over the 19-year period.We supplement team size with measures of domestic and foreign institutional collaborations, which
capture the geographic dispersion of teamworkers. The time series evidence suggests that the trend towards more geographically
dispersed scientific teams accelerates beginning with papers published at the start of the 1990s. This acceleration suggests a
sharp decline in the cost of collaboration. Our hypothesis is that the decline is due to the deployment of the National Science
Foundation’s NSFNET and its connection to networks in Europe and Japan after 1987.
Using a panel of top university departments we also find that private universities and departments whose scientists have
earned prestigious awards participate in larger teams, as do departments that have larger amounts of federal funding. Placement
of former graduate students is a key determinant of institutional collaborations, especially collaborations with firms and with
foreign scientific institutions. Finally, the evidence suggests that scientific output and influence increase with team size and that
influence rises along with institutional collaborations. Since increasing team size implies an increase in the division of labor,
these results suggest that scientific productivity increases with the scientific division of labor.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: L3; O3
Keywords: Science; Research and development; Collaboration; Teams
1. Introduction
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 518 276 2523;
fax: +1 518 276 2235. Over the past century teams of scientific special-
E-mail address: adamsj@rpi.edu (J.D. Adams). ists have largely replaced the independent scientist,
0048-7333/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2005.01.014
260 J.D. Adams et al. / Research Policy 34 (2005) 259–285
much as corporate R&D laboratories have largely re-
placed the independent inventor. This trend towards
larger teams is strongly evident in nearly all data on
scientific research, including our own.1 Advancing in-
strumentation and the sheer quantity of what there is
to know have pushed it, while improving transporta-
tion and communications have pulled it, to its present
state of development. Purely pencil-and-paper research
is the lone exception to the rule. But this forms a dwin-
dling share of science and may give in to the same
forces that have lead to large-scale research elsewhere.
The study of scientific teams is important for at least
two reasons. First, it brings to light changes in the re-
search production function that would otherwise stay
hidden. In particular, scientific collaboration might in-
crease the effectiveness of research, just as specializa-
tion increases general productive efficiency.2 The ev-
idence on efficiency is suggestive but not definitive.
Collaborative research is more highly cited (Presser,
1980; Sauer, 1988), suggesting that collaboration does
raise quality. But more able researchers also attract
more coworkers (Zuckerman andMerton, 1973) so that
separating efficiency from talent in a cross-section is
not easy. In addition the higher citation rate could re-
flect hidden self-citations between teammembers. Still,
the size of scientific teams has increased steadily with
time, so that growth in capital, knowledge, transport,
and communication could be responsible for the rising
propensity to collaborate, even as talent has remained
about the same.
A second reason why collaboration is important lies
in its role as a channel of knowledge flows between
scientists. And since collaborators are increasingly
found in different institutions and countries, the entire
subject is relevant to the tendency for knowledge to
flow more readily and over greater distances than ever
before and to the enlargement of the scale and scope
of knowledge spillovers.
1 See Zuckerman and Merton (1973), de Solla Price (1986), and
Hicks and Katz (1996), for trends in the size of scientific teams since
1900. Wiener (1994), writing about mid-century, strongly disap-
proves of the notion that corporate R&D laboratories might supplant
individual researchers and inventors. And yet Mowery and Rosen-
berg (1998, Ch. 2) describes exactly this process of replacement.
2 The form of the research production function is central to the
properties of growthmodels, as a comparison between Romer (1990)
and Jones (1995) reveals. Thus, the findings of this paper could prove
indirectly relevant to growth theory.
Our analysis beginswith a simplemodel of team for-
mation in which talent and team size increase with the
stock of knowledge, the quality of an institution’s re-
search management, and prior success at grant-raising.
In addition the model addresses the causes behind the
geographic dispersion of research teams, also known
as institutional collaboration. This is shown to increase
when research budgets are more responsive to geo-
graphic dispersion and when coordination costs in-
crease less rapidly with that dispersion.
The paper continues with extensive empirical work
on scientific teams and institutional collaborations.
This research relies on a database that covers most of
U.S. science during the years 1981–1999. The empir-
ical work that uses this data falls into three parts. The
first describes time trends in team size and institutional
collaboration across science using a series of figures.
The second describes trends in teams and collabora-
tions by field of science. Given the complexity of the
field and time dimensions, we present the second set of
findings using tables rather than figures. The third and
final part of the empirical work consists of regression
analysis of a panel of university-fields observed over
time. This analysis examines the underlying determi-
nants of team size and institutional collaborations. The
regression findings are in general agreement with the
implications of the model.
Descriptive findings include the following, which
apply out overall and for most field. Team size in-
creases by about 50% over the period 1981–1999. This
trend towards larger teams is found to accelerate, rising
from a 2.19% annual rate of growth in the 1980s to a
2.57% rate in the 1990s. This is an acceleration fac-
tor of 17% (2.57/2.19− 1) between the two decades.
Usingmileage indicators between the top 110U.S. uni-
versities that form the core of our data, we study geo-
graphic dispersion directly. The annual rate of growth
in mileage rises from 3.53% in the 1980s to 4.45% in
the 1990s, an acceleration of 29%.
During the period 1981–1999 the rate of domestic
institutional collaboration more than doubled between
U.S. universities and between U.S. universities and
U.S. firms. Foreign collaborations, while not as com-
mon, increased five-fold. Of all regions, collaboration
with Asia increased most rapidly, followed by Europe,
with all other regions trailing by a considerablemargin.
These differences reflect differences in the growth rates
of scientific research by region of theworld.Aswith the
261J.D. Adams et al. / Research Policy 34 (2005) 259–285
other indicators foreign collaboration accelerates going
into the 1990s. The foreign share in institutional col-
laborations rose annually by 5.11% during the 1980s,
but by 7.41% during the 1990s. Thus, growth in for-
eign collaboration accelerates by 45% (7.41/5.11− 1)
over the two decades. We conclude that institutional
collaboration, especially in the international sphere,
has undergone accelerating growth in recent decades.
In additional work we use regression analysis to in-
vestigate factors that might promote or hinder the for-
mation of teams and collaborations. This analysis is
carried out using a panel of 12 main sciences in the top
110U.S. universities. Hence, the observations are at the
level of university-fields over time. Our results include
the following: a larger stock of federally funded R&D,
private control of a university, and the number of pres-
tigious awards increase team size. Collaboration with
other U.S. universities is an increasing function of the
stock ofR&D, private control, and the number of recent
Ph.D.’s placed in other top 110 schools. Collaboration
with foreign institutions of science is found to increase
with the stock of R&D, private control, the number
of prestigious awards, and with placement of recent
Ph.D.’s in leading research countries. Here the results
are more fragile, and there is evidence that the stock of
R&D and private control trade places with the number
of prestigious awards. In addition we examine collab-
oration with U.S. firms, finding again that R&D and
private control increase joint scientific research with
firms. But in this case, prestigious awards decrease
collaboration with firms, probably because universi-
ties earning such awards emphasize basic rather than
applied research. As with foreign collaboration, place-
ment of recent Ph.D.’s in industry is a significant factor
in determining collaboration between universities and
firms. The greater importance of Ph.D. placements in
the case of foreign and corporate collaborations than in
university collaborations is consistent with the scarcity
of close substitutes for former Ph.D.’s as coworkers in
foreign and corporate environments.
The empirical work concludes with a study of the
role of team size and collaboration in the determination
of research output as measured by papers and citations.
The papers and citations are “fractionated,” in that they
consist of estimated proportions that a university and
field contribute to both. We find that papers and es-
pecially citations increase with team size, but that the
role of shares of institutional affiliations in the produc-
tion of papers is less clear. Universities that collaborate
more with foreign institutions, and especially other top
110 schools, produce fewer papers, holding team size
constant, in part because a fraction of the papers is “out-
sourced”. On the other hand collaboration with foreign
institutions and other top 110 schools is linked to an
increase in total citations, so that a trade off of fewer
papers in return for larger overall scientific influence
may be taking place.
The rest of this paper consists of six sections. Sec-
tion 2 reviews the literature and models the underlying
determinants of scientific teams and institutional col-
laborations. Section 3 describes the database and the
calculations that we have undertaken using it. Section
4 presents time series evidence on scientific teams and
institutional collaborations. Section 5 compares trends
in these indicators across scientific disciplines. Section
6 provides regression evidence on the determinants of
team size and institutional collaborations using a panel
of university-fields. Section 7 concludes.
2. Analytical framework
The economics literature on teams is both theoreti-
cal and empirical. One line of theoretical work exam-
ines the problem of free-riding and proposes incentive
schemes that punish shirking (Holmstrom, 1982; Kan-
del and Lazear, 1992). Another line of research exam-
ines the relationship between specialization, team size,
and the extent of the market (Becker, 1985; Becker and
Murphy, 1992), while (Rosen, 1982) looks at the role
of managerial talent in determining the size of the firm
and its work force using an efficient supervisionmodel.
Recent empirical research on teams in steel mills by
Ichniowski et al. (1997) finds that innovative manage-
ment practices that promote cooperation in teams and
offer pay incentives increase productivity in steel mini-
mills over traditional management practices that tend
to limit worker responsibility. Other empirical research
examines institutional collaborations in science and
technology (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Mowery,
1992; Powell, 1996; Stephan and Levin, 2000; Zucker
et al., 2001; Adams et al., 2001; Adams, 2002; Adams
et al., 2003; Adams and Marcu, 2004; Adams, 2005).
These papers tend to find that institutional collabora-
tion is related to the complementarity of skills, often
abetted by policy and by the increasing complexity of
scientific problems.
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The present paper concerns small teams of co-
workers in scientific research. However, owing to the
location of teammembers in different scientific institu-
tions, the paper is concerned with institutional collab-
orations as well. Unlike some previous literature this
paper abstracts from free-riding and supervision, be-
cause the system of reward for priority in discovery
severely punishes individual shirking by teammembers
and rewards good work with publication, reputation,
and income. Following Becker and Murphy (1992) we
regard the analysis of teams as closely linked with spe-
cialization, the division of labor, and the location of
team members, because these factors play large roles
in the empirical analysis and influence the efficiency of
scientific research.
In the subsequent exposition we assume that sci-
entific research yields satisfaction to investigators, but
we suppose that this gain in utility is insufficient for in-
vestigators to self-finance their research. We base this
assumption on the rarity of scientific research in so-
cieties that lack government or private philanthropic
support for science. But if self-finance is ruled out,
then it follows that the quantity of research is subject
to an externally imposed research budget constraint,
even though the budget is responsive to grant-raising
efforts.3 In conformity with the empirical work and
with the perception that skill, specialization, and the di-
vision of labor are inter-related and essential elements
in the formation of scientific teams, we assume that the
decision variables are the skill of team workers s, the
size of the team n, and distance, or geographic disper-
sion between team workersD.4 Geographic dispersion
exceeds zero if and only if the team involves institu-
tional collaboration so that we regardD as an indicator
of such collaboration.
Research output Q is produced according to a
Cobb–Douglas production function that depends on
skill and team size. Therefore,
βQ = Asα n . (1)
3 In the analysis we assume that the research budget R is at a
maximum with respect to grant-raising efforts.
4 We abstract from the inter-relatedness of skill and distance,which
implies that s= s(D), s# > s## < 0. This constraint would be relevant if
abilities were noticeably scarce within a given distance. The analysis
in the paper could easily be extended to deal with this complicating
factor.
The exponents obey the inequalities 0 <α < 1,0 <β 
< 1,α +β < 1 so that production is subject to decreas-
ing returns to scale. The parameter A represents to-
tal factor productivity. It could represent the university
environment and the ability or eminence of faculties
that are matched to these environments in advance of
the formation of scientific teams. A also undergoes in-
dependent increases as knowledge expands, because
knowledge is a factor of production, even though it is
fixed with respect to individual researchers. In turn A
tends to increase skill and team size. Thus, complex-
ity of projects can be viewed as an indicator for the
stock of knowledge and other sources of total factor
productivity of the knowledge production function that
give larger teams an increasing advantage. It has been
suggested to us that sociological “norms” of scientific
fields have changed in favor of larger teams. However,
another interpretation is that larger and higher-skilled
teams are more efficient as knowledge increases, so
that norms are simply a reflection of efficiency rather
than an independent causal factor that increases the di-
vision of scientific labor. And besides all the above,
the increasing emphasis by funding agencies on team
awards involving large grants and multiple scientific
institutions is consistent with the advantages of larger
teams as driven by A in this framework, in which the
advantages are likely driving the policies.
On the cost side we assume that the research budget
R must cover wage costs of all team members, as well
as a fixed cost F that depends on dispersion of team
workers, representing coordination costs. Of course,
geographic dispersion entails benefits as well as costs.
In part the gain derives from the additional funding that
can be secured, as the evidence presented below on in-
ternational and firm–university collaboration suggests.
This is the productive role of dispersion in the present
analysis. The research budget constraint is:
R(D) = w(s) n + F (D). (2)
The amount of funding is assumed to be a concave
function of distance, so that
R# > 0, R## < 0. (3)
Thus, the returns to dispersion are diminishing. Below
we allow for both a shift in funding and also of the
sensitivity of funding to distance or dispersion, which
are plausible causes of institutional collaborations. For
example, funding could increase as a result of prior
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awards. Alternatively, an increase in the urban density
of universities would tend to increase the sensitivity of
funding to distance. In (2) thewage ratew is an increas-
ing and convex function of skill, as in the phenomenon
of “superstars” (Rosen, 1981). This yields the follow-
ing properties of the wage function:
# ## w > 0, w > 0. (4)
We suppose that the fixed cost F, which represents co-
ordination costs, is an increasing function of distance
D owing to the difficulty of meeting and communicat-
ing which D imposes. Therefore, the properties of the
fixed cost function are
F # > 0, F ## > 0. (5)
In (5) coordination costs are an increasing function of
distance. As in the case of funding R, changes in the
fixed costs of scientific teams are plausible and realistic
features of cross-sectional and time series data. Fixed
costs and their sensitivity to geographic dispersion tend
to decline over time, with improvements in transport
and telecommunications. F also tends to decrease with
prior investments in team workers, especially gradu-
ate students, which make working at a distance less
costly. This is likely to be a potent factor in both cross-
sectional data, where universities with larger and more
highly ranked graduate programs are more likely to en-
gage in institutional collaborations; and in time series
data, due to the growth of graduate programs over time.
The problem is one ofmaximizing output (1) subject
to the research budget constraint (2) and their properties
as expressed in (3)–(5), where the control variables are
skill s, team size n, and distance D. The Lagrangian
function for this problem is
βL = Asα n + λ[R(D)− w(s) n − F (D)] (6)
First order conditions for (6) are
∂L αQ #= − λw n = 0
∂s s 
∂L βQ = − λw = 0
∂n n (7)
∂L = λ(R# − F #) ≤ 0
∂D 
∂L = R − wn − F = 0
∂λ 
Optimal amounts of skill and team size are assumed
to exceed zero, so that the first two expressions are
equalities. The third expression of (7) is for the mo-
ment left as an inequality, to suggest that if funding is
sufficiently unresponsive to dispersion, then D equals
zero and institutional collaboration does not occur.
However, consider the casewhereD> 0, so that vari-
ations in all three controls are allowed. The second or-
der conditions that ensure a maximum for this problem
are that the determinants of the bordered Hessian of the
Lagrangian alternate in sign:
! ! 
! ! ! Lss Lsn 0 Lsλ ! 
! 
Lss Lsn Lsλ ! ! ! 
! ! ! 
Lsn Lnn 0 Lnλ ! 
! 
Lsn Lnn Lnλ ! > 0, ! ! < 0
! ! ! 
0 0 LDD 0 !Lsλ Lnλ 0
! !Lsλ Lnλ 0 0
(8)
The specific form of (8) reflects the separability of
the first order conditions for n, s from the first order
condition for D. For exceptionally clear statements of
the general conditions see Chiang (1974, Section 12.3)
or Dixit (1990, Ch. 7). Using this information and the
method of comparative statics we can show that skill
s and team size n tend to increase with productivity A.
To see this form the displacement system of (7),
 1
  
− Qs dAds 















 Lss Lsn 0 Lsλ 
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Solving (9) for changes in the control variables and
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We have pre- and post-multiplied the right hand side
of the equality (10) by−1. Since by (8) [H] and [H]−1
are negative definite, the expression on the right of (10)
is strictly negative as shown so that a weighted com-
bination of s and n increases as A increases. Likewise
we can show that an increase in sensitivity of funding
to distance D, or a decrease in sensitivity of fixed costs
F both cause an increase in D and institutional collab-
oration. Finally, an exogenous increase in funding R,
perhaps due to past awards, will tend to increase team
size and skill. These implications fit the regression re-
sults in Section 6 rather well.
3. Database of scientific papers
The data set consists of 2.4 million scientific papers,
published during 1981–1999, that have at least one
author from a set of leading U.S. universities. These
“top 110” universities account for most of U.S. aca-
demic research. All papers belong to a standard set of
communications consisting of articles, reviews, notes,
and proceedings. The source of the data is the Institute
for Scientific Information (ISI) in Philadelphia, specif-
ically ISI’s Current Contents data base.5
The papers are assigned to fields according to the
classification of the journal in which they appear. This
classification system consists of 88 academic fields. In
order to link the paper data to the 12 main sciences
in the National Science Foundation (NSF) CASPAR
database, we assign each of the 88 sub-fields to one of
the 12 main fields.6 The Appendix lists the 110 univer-
sities, ranked by their R&D funding in 1998. Table 1
shows the 12 main NSF sciences and their 88 sub-field
components.
As noted in the introduction we use the data both
at the paper level and at the level of university-fields.
At the paper level we compile time trends and cross-
sectional patterns byfield andyear. The data record date
of publication, scientific fields of journals in which the
papers appear, institutional affiliation of authors, ad-
5 The journal set consists of approximately 5500 journals that were
active in 1999, as well as about 1600 inactive journals that were cited
by the active journals.
6 The 12 fields are: agriculture, astronomy, biology, chemistry,
computer science, earth sciences, economics and business, engineer-
ing, mathematics and statistics, medicine, physics, and psychology.
dress information on city, state, and country; and author
names as well as number of authors.7
It is important to see that the address information is
completely separate from author information, so that
a name cannot easily be assigned to a location at this
time. The address information is nevertheless useful
in its own right. Besides the top 110 universities the
addresses identify U.S. and foreign institutions con-
sisting of other universities and colleges; governments
and government research institutes; medical centers;
corporations; and all other institutions.8 Among other
uses we employ the addresses to construct fractions of
scientific papers written in one or more of the top 110
schools.9
We also construct numbers and shares of different
types of institutions as estimates of the location of team
workers. Within the U.S. the institutional types con-
sist of: (a) U.S. Government; (b) Other U.S. Univer-
sities; (c) U.S. Corporations; (d) U.S. Medical Cen-
ters; and (e) All Other U.S. Institutions. Outside the
U.S. the institutional types consist of: (a) Foreign Gov-
ernments; (b) Foreign Universities; and (c) All Other
Foreign Institutions, including by country. As we have
seen, this information allows us to assign fractions of
papers to different institutional classes as well as to
provide indicators of the proportional contribution by
each class.
Table 2 reports the distribution of scientific pa-
pers by the 12 main science fields. The table includes
the years 1981, 1990, and 1999 and all years, show-
ing which fields gain share and which lose share.
7 There is no limit at this time on the number of authors in the ISI
data. The maximum number in our sample is 210, while the mean
number in the paper-level data is 2.36. Notice that the number of au-
thors underestimates the number of team members when it excludes
contributors, such as research assistants. It is an overestimate when it
includes honorific authors. In short, the number of authors measures
the size of scientific teams with error. This error is unavoidable since
we lack any other measure of team size.
8 About 5% of the addresses could not be assigned.
9 The fractions are 1/2, 1/2 in the case of two institutions, 1/3,
1/3, 1/3 for three institutions, and so on. The cumulative distribution
of the number of top 110 institutions per paper is as follows, with
number of institutions in parentheses: 79.6% (1 institution), 96.8%
(2 institutions or less), 98.3% (3 institutions or less), and 99.5% (4
institutions or less). Of course, these are extremely crude indicators
of contributions because they do not include time and effort by team
members, nor do they differentiate among types of effort. In short,
the institutional address fractions do not measure labor input, even
though we use them to attribute output to scientific institutions.
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Table 1
Composition of 12 main science fields, papers and citations of the top 110 U.S. universities
Main science field Sub-fields within main science fields
Agriculture General agriculture and agronomy; aquatic sciences; animal sciences; plant sciences; agricultural chemistry;
entomology and pest control; food science and nutrition; veterinary medicine and animal health
Astronomy Astronomy and astrophysics
Biology General biological sciences; biochemistry and biophysics; cell and developmental biology; ecology and
environment; molecular biology and genetics; biotechnology and applied microbiology; microbiology;
experimental biology; immunology; neurosciences and behavior; pharmacology and toxicology; physiology;
oncogenesis and cancer research
Chemistry General chemistry; analytical chemistry; inorganic and nuclear chemistry; organic chemistry and polymer
science; physical chemistry and chemical physics; spectroscopy, instrumentation, and analytical science
Computer science Computer science and engineering; information technology and communications systems
Earth sciences Atmospheric sciences; geology and other earth sciences; geological, petroleum, and mining engineering;
oceanography
Economics and business Economics; accounting; decision and information sciences; finance, insurance, and real estate; management;
marketing
Engineering Aeronautical engineering; biomedical engineering; chemical engineering; civil engineering; electrical and
electronics engineering; engineering mathematics; environmental engineering and energy; industrial
engineering; materials science; mechanical engineering; metallurgy; nuclear engineering
Mathematics and statistics Mathematics; biostatistics and statistics
Medicine General and internal medicine; anesthesia and intensive care; cardiovascular and hematology research;
cardiovascular and respiratory systems; clinical immunology and infectious disease; clinical psychology and
psychiatry; dentistry and oral surgery; dermatology; endocrinology, metabolism, and nutrition; environmental
medicine and public health; gastroenterology and hepatology; health care sciences and services; hematology;
medical research, diagnosis, and treatment; medical research, general topics; medical research, organs and
systems; neurology; oncology; ophthalmology; orthopedics, rehabilitation, and sports medicine; otolaryngology;
pediatrics; radiology, nuclear medicine, and imaging; reproductive medicine; research, laboratory medicine, and
medical technology; rheumatology; surgery; urology and nephrology
Physics General physics; applied physics, condensed matter, and materials science; optics and acoustics
Psychology Psychology and psychiatry
Source: Institute for Scientific Information.
Table 2
Distribution of papers by field, of the top 110 U.S. universities 1981, 1990, 1999, and all years
Field of science Number of papers
1981 1990 1999 All years
Agriculture 8,697 (9.0%) 10,714 (8.5%) 9,341 (6.1%) 189,004 (7.8%)
Astronomy 1,688 (1.7%) 1,581 (1.3%) 2,913 (1.9%) 35,508 (1.5%)
Biology 24,928 (25.7%) 32,495 (25.7%) 41,742 (27.4%) 634,737 (26.3%)
Chemistry 7,951 (8.2%) 10,432 (8.3%) 12,205 (8.0%) 194,798 (8.1%)
Computer science 872 (0.9%) 1,611 (1.3%) 2,045 (1.3%) 28,037 (1.2%)
Earth sciences 2,802 (2.9%) 3,818 (3.0%) 4,956 (3.3%) 72,920 (3.0%)
Economics 1,758 (1.8%) 2,600 (2.1%) 2,363 (1.6%) 43,540 (1.8%)
Engineering 5,334 (5.5%) 9,204 (7.3%) 11,689 (7.7%) 170,147 (7.1%)
Mathematics 3,086 (3.2%) 3,127 (2.5%) 3,623 (2.4%) 60,710 (2.5%)
Medicine 26,791 (27.6%) 33,154 (26.3%) 41,199 (27.0%) 648,704 (26.9%)
Physics 7,289 (7.5%) 11,521 (9.1%) 13,840 (9.1%) 215,942 (9.0%)
Psychology 5,770 (6.0%) 6,017 (4.8%) 6,538 (4.3%) 115,482 (4.8%)
Total 96,966 126,274 152,454 2,409,529
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations.
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Among the life sciences, which dominate the data,
biology gains while agriculture loses. Among the
physical sciences astronomy and physics gain share.
Not surprisingly, among the mathematical sciences,
computer science gains and mathematics and statis-
tics lose. Engineering increases its share, and fi-
nally, the social and behavioral sciences perceptibly
lose share.
Weuse paper-level statistics for the descriptivework
in Sections 4 and 5, because this retains the means and
standard deviations of the original data. In Section 6
we carry out regression analysis of the determinants of
team size, domestic and foreign collaboration, and re-
search “output”. For this purpose we construct a panel
at the level of universities, fields and years. The reason
is that the panel allows us to combine the ISI papers and
citations data with information on lagged university-
field level R&D and characteristics of doctoral pro-
grams. The NSF CASPAR database of universities,
a compendium of NSF surveys, is the source of the
data on university R&D. The National Research Coun-
cil (NRC) 1993 Survey of Doctoral Programs (NRC,
1995) includes characteristics of graduate programs,
especially counts of Nobel prizes and other prestigious
awards, as well as rankings of quality of Ph.D. pro-
grams in 1993. Finally,microdata from theNSFSurvey
of Earned Doctorates (SED) provide us with estimates
of the migration of Ph.D. students to the academic and
industrial sectors of the U.S. economy, as well as to
other countries.10
We impose one other constraint on the panel, which
does not apply to the paper-level data. We consider
only leading departments out of the top 110. All other
schools form a remainder cell within each field. More
precisely, we include the top 25 universities in astron-
omy plus a remainder, the top 50 universities in agri-
culture, chemistry, computer science, economics and
business, earth sciences, mathematics and statistics,
physics, and psychology, plus one remainder each. And
finally we include the top 75 universities in biology,
medicine, and engineering plus remainders for each
10 The migration data used in this paper represents flows of new
Ph.D.’s with definite plans at the time of graduation, so that the des-
tinations that we use are projected as within a few months of grad-
uation. The data are undercounts, since one-third of new Ph.D.’s do
not have definite plans. Moreover, the data represent even a greater
undercount to industry, since many new Ph.D.’s go to industry only
after completing their postdoctoral training.
of these three fields. Summing across fields, and ac-
counting for the fact that only 48 schools of agriculture
formally exist, the panel data consist of 660 university-
fields in any given year. Our purpose in breaking out
fewer individual schools in smaller fields, and more in
larger fields, is to avoid large numbers of empty cells
for universities in which fields (and doctoral programs)
are small or non-existent.11 The result is a panel of
12,540 observations, before bad or missing data are ex-
cluded, that approximates teams and institutional col-
laborations of 660 university-fields in 12main sciences
over the 19-year period. This panel includes an array of
variables that are likely to drive teams, collaborations,
and research output.We describe the major variables in
the panel data and sources of these variables in Section
6, where we consider determinants of team size and
collaboration.
4. Time trends in scientific collaborations
This section documents upward trends in scientific
teams and institutional collaborations. Figs. 1–10
display time series of scientific research, team size,
and institutional collaborations by type of partner and
by domestic–international classification. All graphs
refer to the period 1981–1999. Fig. 1 shows trends
in the output of U.S. scientific papers. The upper line
is total papers having at least one author from a top
110 U.S. university. The middle line consists of U.S.
equivalent papers: the fraction of U.S. institutions in
all institutions on each paper summed over all papers.
The lower line consists of top 110 paper equivalents.
This is the fraction of top 110 U.S. institutions in
all institutions summed over papers. U.S. and top
110 equivalent papers grow more slowly than total
papers. Top 110 equivalents decline by 2.5% as of
1999 compared with the 1995 peak. The growing
spread between total papers and U.S. equivalents
shows the growing contribution of foreign institutions.
This could be seen as beneficial: foreign institutions
produce more of the research and transfer more of
11 The size of the remainder of the top 110 equals an average
university-field in the individual top 25, 50, or 75 schools in a field,
showing that the residual aggregation procedure misses rather little.
This finding reflects the positive skew of academic programs. For
more on this see Adams and Griliches (1998).
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Fig. 1. Total papers, top 110 equivalents, and U.S. equivalents of the top 110 U.S. universities, 1981–1999.
Fig. 2. Top 110 U.S. universities and top 200 U.S. R&D firms, per paper, 1981–1999.
their knowledge to the U.S. Or it could be grounds firms per paper grow at about the same rate, growth
for pessimism: remaining in the same place after 1995 in collaboration with firms is less rapid in the 1980s
required an increase in the foreign contribution. and more rapid in the 1990s. This acceleration in
Fig. 2 graphs domestic collaboration with other top university–firm joint research poses an issue of attri-
110 schools (left scale) and with the top 200 U.S. R&D bution that will be a recurring theme of this paper. It
firms (right scale).12 While the number of schools and could represent increasing placement of graduate stu-
12 We define the number of other top 110 schools as the number of In this way we account for conditioning of the data on membership
top 110 schools minus one, which represents the “home” institution. in the top 110 universities.
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Fig. 3. Foreign schools, foreign institutions, and all institutions, per paper, 1981–1999.
dents with firms rather than schools, it could stand for
the success of federal programs designed to promote
joint research, it could be a by-product of decelerating
growth in government support for academic research,
or it could signify a slowdown in industrial support for
basic research leading to increasing reliance on univer-
sity collaborators. This last point is consistent with the
decline in scientific papers published in industry since
1991. On this point see National Science Foundation,
Science and Engineering Indicators (2004, Volume II,
Table 5–36).
Comparative trends in foreign and total collabora-
tions are the subject of Fig. 3. Trends in foreign uni-
versities and foreign institutions per paper are on the
left scale. The right scale indicates the total of all in-
stitutions. Collaborations with foreign universities and
institutions grow more rapidly than institutional col-
laboration as a whole, consistent with Fig. 1.13
Fig. 4 finds that growth rates in team size (authors
per paper) and institutional collaborations are about the
same. Given that foreign collaborations are growing
more rapidly than all collaborations, domestic collabo-
rations have to growmore slowly than team size. Thus,
13 Correcting the total for conditioning on a top 110 university, the
total institutions series increases from0.8 to 2.0, or 2.5 times. Foreign
schools per paper increase from 0.07 to 0.32, or more than 4.5 times,
while all foreign affiliations increase from 0.1 to 0.46, which is again
more than 4.5 times.
scientific teams are becoming more internationalized
over time.
The next two figures examine trends in foreign col-
laborationby regionof theworld.14 Fig. 5 reports trends
in counts of foreign addresses per paper. Europe is the
dominant region for collaboration, reflecting the size
of its scientific sector. The countries of East and South
Asia come in second by the end of the period, followed
by the rest of the Americas. The rest of the world,
composed of Africa, the Middle East, and Oceania,
runs a distant fourth. Fig. 6 brings out more clearly
the differences in growth by region. The figure nor-
malizes each of the series in Fig. 5 by its 1981 value.
Growth is more rapid in Asia and Europe and slower
in the Americas and the rest of the world. This dif-
ference clearly reflects the faster growth of scientific
resources in Asia and Europe than in the rest of the
world.
Figs. 7 and 8 consider interactions between team
size and the foreign share of institutional affiliations.
14 In this figure Europe consists of Western and Eastern Europe as
well as the European Soviet Socialist Republics of the former So-
viet Union. Asian countries include Japan, India, China, and other
countries of East and South Asia, such asMalaysia, Indonesia, South
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Other countries in the Americas in-
clude Canada, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.
Africa, the Middle East, and Oceania includes Israel (Middle East)
and Australia and New Zealand (Oceania), and thus contains the
developed countries in each region.
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Fig. 4. Mean authors and institutions, per paper, 1981–1999.
Fig. 7 displays raw data on the foreign share clas- more clearly again by normalizing each of the series
sified by intervals of team size. The foreign share in Fig. 7 by its 1981 value. The graph shows that
is greater in larger teams. International cost-sharing smaller teams are becoming more internationalized
of large-scale projects could lie behind this relation- at a faster rate. Since larger teams are more interna-
ship, for example in instrument time-sharing, in the tionalized in 1981, this pattern of comparative growth
Human Genome project, in large-scale space mis- implies convergence in the foreign share by team
sions, and so on. Fig. 8 brings out comparative growth size.
Fig. 5. Foreign address counts per paper, by region of the world, 1981–1999.
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Fig. 6. Normalized foreign address counts per paper, by region of the world, 1981–1999 (1981 = 1.0).
Figs. 9 and 10 indicate comparative trends in the tional fields are astronomy, mathematics and statistics,
foreign share by groups of fields. Fig. 9 reports time and physics. The three least international fields are
series of the foreign share in which fields are grouped agriculture, biology, and medicine. Foreign shares of
by their initial foreign share. The three most interna- remaining fields (chemistry, computer science, earth
Fig. 7. Foreign address share per paper, by team size, 1981–1999.
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Fig. 8. Normalized foreign address share per paper, by team size, 1981–1999 (1981 = 1.0).
sciences, economics, engineering, and psychology) lie 5. Findings on collaborative behavior by field
in the middle. Fig. 10 brings out comparative growth of science
more clearly by normalizing each of the series in Fig. 9
by its 1981 value. The figure shows that the life sci- We turn now to descriptive findings by field of sci-
ences are becoming internationalized at the most rapid ence. The purpose of the section is to reveal differences
rate. Since these fields are the least internationalized at by field of science in the growth of team size and insti-
the start, this result suggests mild convergence in the tutional collaboration.We display the results in a series
foreign shares. of tables given the number of fields that each entails.
Fig. 9. Foreign address share per paper, by degree of internationalization, 1981–1999.
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Fig. 10. Normalized foreign address share per paper, by degree of internationalization, 1981–1999 (1981 = 1.0).
Table 3
Team size and its rate of growth, by field, of the top 110 U.S. universities 1981, 1990, and 1999
Field of science Mean authors per paper
1981 Percentage of annual growth
rate (1981–1990)

































































Total 2.766 2.19 3.368 2.57 4.244
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations.
Table 3 reports team size in 1981, 1990, and 1999, as
well as growth in team size across the decades of the
1980s and 1990s. In 10 of 12 fields, growth occursmore
rapidly in the 1990s. This pattern dominates the grand
average in the bottom row. Acceleration in the growth
of team size is the rule.
Table 4 explores geographic dispersion of team
members within the top 110 U.S. universities. We as-
sume that the highest ranked university-field on each
paper is the “head” institution and proceed to calcu-
late mileages to other top 110 institutions on that pa-
per based on latitude and longitude coordinates.15 If
only one top 110 institution participates in a paper then
the mileage is zero. Therefore, changes in the mileage
statistics depend on changes in the tendency to work
15 The calculation assumes that the earth is a sphere and calculates
distance using the geodesic or shortest distance between two points
on that sphere. For more, see Adams and Jaffe (1996) and Adams
(2002).
J.D. Adams et al. / Research Policy 34 (2005) 259–285 273
Table 4
Distance between team workers in the top 110 U.S. universities, by field, 1981, 1990, and 1999
Field of science Mean distance in miles
1981 Percentage of annual growth
rate (1981–1990)

































































Total 77.7 3.53 106.8 4.45 159.4
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations.
with other top 110 schools. The average mileage on
a paper directly captures geographic dispersion within
the system of top 110 schools.
The table reports mean distances in 1981, 1990,
and 1999 and compares growth rates across decades.
Growth in geographic dispersion is quite clear but ac-
celeration in growth is less obvious. Six of 12 fields
show evidence of acceleration (agriculture, chemistry,
earth sciences, engineering, physics, and psychology),
the growth of one (biology) is constant, and the re-
maining five (astronomy, computer science, economics
and business,mathematics and statistics, andmedicine)
reveal mild deceleration. And yet the overall pattern
is one of growth acceleration. Table 4 reveals the
expanding geographic scope of collaboration within
the top 110 universities: mean distances double from
78 to 159 miles over the period. And despite some
mixed results, overall growth accelerates across the
two decades. On average the rate of growth in mileage
increases from 3.5% in the 1980s to 4.5% in the
1990s.
Table 5 considers patterns of domestic institu-
tional collaboration by field. The table is specifi-
cally concerned with collaborations with other top
110 schools and with top 200 R&D firms. The ta-
ble reports levels of collaboration of both kinds in
1981 and 1999 and reports growth over the full pe-
riod. The table reveals changes in collaboration within
academia, as well as between academia and indus-
try. Growth in collaboration within the university sec-
tor is most rapid in agriculture, biology, chemistry,
and psychology. The collaboration between universi-
ties and firms follows a slightly different pattern. Col-
laboration in the life sciences (agriculture, biology, and
medicine) and psychology expands the most rapidly
of all. Industry–university collaboration in more estab-
lished industrial–scientific fields like chemistry, com-
puter science, engineering, and physics grows less
rapidly. Of course, the level of collaboration is far
higher in these fields than in the life and behav-
ioral sciences. Astronomy and economics are the only
fields where university–firm collaboration declines.
All of these patterns are likely the result of changes
in the population of industrial scientists in different
disciplines.
Table 5 allows us to compare growth rates in domes-
tic collaboration across sectors and fields. Define a rel-
ative increase in the “outward” dimension of a field as
an excess in growth of collaboration with industry over
growth in collaboration with universities. Likewise an
increase in a field’s “inward” dimension takes place
when the growth rate with industry falls short of the
growth rate with universities. Based on this criterion,
agriculture, biology, computer science, medicine, and
psychology are becoming more outward disciplines.
By the same token astronomy, chemistry, earth science,
economics and business, engineering,mathematics and
statistics, and physics are becoming more inward.
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Table 5
Indicators of U.S. institutional collaboration, by field, papers of the top 110 universities, 1981 and 1999
Field of science Other top 110 universities per papera Top 200 firms per paper
1981 Percentage of annual growth
rate (1981–1999)











































































Total 0.345 4.70 0.843 0.014 4.18 0.031
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations.
a This is the number of top 110 universities per paper minus one. This measure maintains symmetry with top 200 firms per paper, which is
the number of “other” institutions as well, in this case, top R&D firms.
Table 6 concludes the descriptive findings by ex- and total institutional affiliations in brackets. Almost
amining trends in foreign collaboration across the sci- without exception growth in the foreign share is more
ences. The table computes the foreign share in all insti- rapid than domestic growth as shown in Table 5. More-
tutions for papers published in 1981, 1990, and 1999. over, growth accelerates in every field. Average growth
It also examines growth in the share across the 1980s is 5.11% in the 1980s but it is 7.41% in the 1990s, so
and 1990s. For comparison we include mean foreign that the acceleration factor here is 0.45 (7.41/5.11− 1).
Table 6
Measures of foreign affiliation, by field, papers of the top 110 universities, 1981, 1990, and 1999





















































































Total 0.036 [0.097, 1.731] 5.11 0.057 [0.186, 1.971] 7.41 0.111 [0.466, 2.840]
Source: Institute for Scientific Information and authors’ calculations.
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Table 7
Means and standard deviations of principal regression variables, top 110 U.S. university data
Variable Mean (S.D.)
Indicators of teamwork and research “output”
Number of authors in a university-field per paper
Number of authors per paper
Other top 110 U.S. universities per paper
Foreign share per paper
U.S. corporate share per paper
Number of papers by a university-field









Stock of federally funded R&D in a university and field (in thousands of 1992 dollars)
Stock of federally funded R&D in a university and field per paper (in thousands of 1992 dollars)
Private university
Number of awardsa
Local university R&D ratiob
Equipment expenditure/R&D, previous 3 years
Share of graduate students placed in top 40% schools, lagged 2 years
Share of graduate students placed in U.S. firms, lagged 2 years










Notes: Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, National Research Council, and authors’
calculations.
a Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for a further discussion.
b The local university R&D ratio equals R&D in the same field, but in other universities, within 25 miles, divided by R&D in the same field,
but in other universities, within 200 miles.
c The top 12 research countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Israel, New
Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland.
6. Regression findings
We now take up the third part of the empirical work.
Following up on themes introduced by the analytical
framework of Section 2, this concerns the problem of
explaining team size, institutional collaboration by sec-
tor and country, and research “output”. For this purpose
we have constructed a panel of universities, fields and
years, in order to match team size, various measures
of institutional collaboration, and research “output”
with data from the National Science Foundation and
the National Research Council that are reported at this
level, as explained in Section 3. Table 7 contains de-
scriptive statistics from the panel. The statistics show
that the average university field-year observation has
a team size of 4.26 authors per paper, of which 2.65,
or almost two-thirds, are estimated to reside within a
university-field.16 The average university-field article
16 The average number of authors is greater in the panel data consist-
ing of university-fields than in the original paper level data, because
involves 0.41 other top 110 universities. On average
foreign institutions contribute a 5.2% share of all insti-
tutional affiliations, while U.S. firms contribute 2.0%.
The average number of papers in a university-field is
149, for which 709 citations are received from other
top 110 universities during its first 5 years including
the year in which the paper is published.
The average stock of deflated R&D is about 58 mil-
lion dollars of 1992.This is the 8-year stockdepreciated
at a 15% rate and lagged 1 year. Thus, the R&D stock in
1981 is the sum of deflated and depreciated R&D over
the years 1973–1980 and likewise for all other years.17
the university-field observations weight large teams more heavily
than do individual papers.
17 The choice of a 8-year (and thus incomplete) R&D stock is dic-
tated by the 1973 start date for flows of R&D in the CASPAR data
base, as this interacts with the 1981 start date of the ISI data. The 8-
year stock is thus the longest history that we have.We should say that
the CASPAR R&D data, while they represent a major achievement
in data collection on universities, also contain substantial respondent
errors. We have tried to flag these errors and to remove all suspicious
observations on R&D from our analysis.
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Table 8
Determinants of team size, dependent variable: log(authors/paper) (t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable or statistic Eq. (8.1) Eq. (8.2) Eq. (8.3) Eq. (8.4)
Time period








Less than 10 workers
Fields included All 12 main fields All 12 main fields 10 fieldsa 10 fieldsa
Year dummies included
Field dummies included
Log (stock of federally funded R&D, divided
by papers lagged 2 years)
Private university (1, yes; 0, no)
Number of awardsa,b
Local university R&D ratioc
Equipment expenditure/R&D, previous 3 years




































Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, the National Science Foundation, the National
Research Council, and authors’ calculations. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the mean number of authors per paper in a university,
field, and year.
a Agriculture and medicine lack data on prizes and awards.
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for a further discussion.
c The local university R&D ratio equals R&D in the same field but in other universities within 25 miles, divided by R&D in the same field but
in other universities within 200 miles.
∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.
∗∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.
The average stock of lagged R&D per paper, a measure
of resources per unit of “output”, is a half million dol-
lars of 1992. Private universities account for 35% of the
sample. On average there are 0.23 prestigious awards
per university-field, as taken from National Research
Council (1995).
The local university R&D ratio captures the geo-
graphic concentration of research in the vicinity of a
university-field, which could measure the ease of insti-
tutional collaboration. The local R&D ratio is defined
as the ratio of other universities’ R&D within 25 miles
to the sameR&Dwithin 200miles. In thisway it tries to
express the convenience of nearby collaborators. The
ratio of equipment expenditure to R&D over the previ-
ous 3 years may suggest capital–labor substitution, as
well as replacement of institutional collaborations by
internal funding in a university.
Sixteen percent of former graduate students go to
a school that ranks in the top 40% of the top 110
universities. Eighteen percent go to U.S. firms, and
5% go to 12 countries that are highly active in sci-
entific research. These variables measure pools of col-
laborators that are likely to have funded research, and
as such could drive shares of other top 110 schools,
U.S. firms, and foreign institutions in the research
of a given university-field. In the empirical work we
lag the graduate student shares by 2 years in or-
der to take publication lags into account, and this
restricts the regression samples to the years 1983–
1999.
Table 8 reports regressions that explain ameasure of
team size, the logarithm of the total authors per paper.
Since authors per paper are university-field means, the
data are continuous and the estimation method is OLS.
All the regressions remove bad or missing data on the
R&D stocks. All include dummy variables for year and
field, in which 1981 and chemistry are the omitted cat-
egories. The dummies absorb trend and field effects,
which are highly significant and resemble those de-
picted in the preceding figures. The general form of
277J.D. Adams et al. / Research Policy 34 (2005) 259–285
the team size regressions is
ln Sizet = α0 + α#Dt + α# FDF + βR ln(R&DStockt)t 
+ βCPrivate university+ βAAwards
+ βLLocal R&Dt + βEEquipment ratiot−1
+ ut (11)
inwhich the subscript for the individual university-field
is suppressed. HereDt is a vector of time dummies and
DF is a vector of field dummies,while Private equals 1 if
a university is privately controlled, and zero otherwise,
and the other variables are explained in conjunction
with Table 7.
Eq. (8.1) is a baseline regression that includes the
logarithmof the stock of federally fundedR&D in thou-
sands of 1992 dollars and the private university indica-
tor. We find that the stock of federally funded R&D per
paper to an extent increases team size.18 This suggests
that larger projects entail greater specialization. Pri-
vate universities also form significantly larger teams,
for which there are several possible explanations. Pri-
vate universities may obtain more R&D funding from
private foundations and wealthy donors, which we are
not able to measure. Another possible reason for the
finding is that better pay, better start-up packages, and
better working conditions in top private institutions at-
tract more talented faculty (Ehrenberg, 2003; Ehren-
berg et al., 2005). This talent advantage, which is re-
lated to salary and governance advantages of top private
institutions, could help to pull together a larger pool of
coworkers (Zuckerman and Merton, 1973).
Eq. (8.2) repeats (8.1) but restricts team size to less
than 10 workers. The idea behind this restriction is that
university-field R&D is increasingly mismatched with
team size as size increases, because an escalating share
of funding is external and is not captured by university-
field R&D. Thus, the error in the R&D stock rises with
team size. Consistent with this idea, the coefficient on
R&D stock increases slightly and is more significant
in (8.2) than (8.1).
Eqs. (8.3) and (8.4) add a battery of variables to (8.1)
and (8.2). As a whole these variables reduce the regres-
sion coefficient of the stock of R&Dper paper. The bat-
18 We divide federally funded R&D by papers lagged 2 years, in
order to avoid division error bias with the logarithm of authors per
paper on the left hand side of the regression.
tery includes the number of prestigious awards. Since
awards data are missing for agriculture and medicine,
(8.3) and (8.4) exclude these two fields. Awards in-
crease team size, consistent with the notion that fund-
ing and talent attract coworkers. The local R&D ratio,
which tries to capture local concentration of potential
teammembers, has a small positive effect on team size.
This is not always significant, perhaps because team
workers in the same school substitute for team workers
elsewhere. The equipment intensity of R&D spending
in the most recent 3 years could signify capital–labor
substitution. Consistent with this its coefficient is neg-
ative, but again this is not always significant. Finally,
the dummy indicator of whether a university-field is in
the top 20% in field decreases team size, possibly in-
dicating the availability of graduate student assistance
within an institution.19
Tables 9–11 consist of Grouped Logit equations.
Their general form is
* + 
stln = α0 + α# tDt + α# FDF1− st 
+ βR ln(R&DStockt)
+ βCPrivate university
+ βP Placementt + βLLocal R&Dt 
+ βEEquipment ratiot−1 + et (12)
We again suppress the university-field subscript for no-
tational simplicity. The idea of (12) is to study determi-
nants of the relative proportion st of team affiliations on
the left of (12) that consists of other U.S. universities,
foreign institutions or U.S. corporations. The share st
is a probability. If this probability follows the Logistic
distribution, then the logarithm of the odds ratio forms
a regression function which (12) exemplifies.20 Un-
like (11) a key variable in this equation is Placementt,
which measures the fraction of recent Ph.D.’s that are
employed in top 40% departments of the top 110, in
the top 12 research countries, and in U.S. industry, as
noted in the discussion of Table 7.
19 The dummy indicator for whether a university-field is in the top
20% of a discipline, and below, the proportion of its graduate stu-
dents that place in the top 40% of schools, need to be carefully dis-
tinguished. They are not the same thing.
20 See Greene (2000), Ch. 19, Section 19.4.6 for a discussion, or see
another survey of the econometrics of limited dependent variables.
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Table 9
Determinants of the relative contribution of U.S. universities, dependent variable: log (other top 110 share/(1− other top 110 share)) (t-statistics
in parentheses)




All 12 main fields
1983–1999







Log (stock of federally funded R&D, per paper
lagged 2 years)
Private university (1, yes; 0, no)
Number of awardsb
Fraction of Ph.D.’s placed in top 40%
departments, lagged 2 years
Local university R&D ratioc
Equipment expenditure/R&D, previous 3 years






































Notes: Estimationmethod is grouped logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, National
Research Council, and authors’ calculations.
a Data on prizes and awards are missing for agriculture and medicine.
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for further discussion.
c The local university R&D ratio equals R&D in the same field but in other universities within 25 miles, divided by R&D in the same field but
in other universities within 200 miles.
*Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.
∗∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.
In Table 9 the dependent variable is the logarithm
of the share of other top 110 schools in the research
of a given university-field divided by one minus the
share. While the relative share seems a useful way to
explore the substitution of research by other top 110
schools for internal research, the method does have one
limitation. Observations for which the relative share
equals zero cannot be included in the estimation pro-
cedure because zero values rule out any finite value
for the regression function. The same point applies
to Tables 10 and 11, which also use Grouped Logit.
However, these zero share observations are few and far
between.
All the equations include year and field dummies,
which are highly significant. In Eqs. (9.1) and (9.3) the
logarithm of the stock of federally funded R&D per
paper significantly increases the share of other top 110
schools. Private universities collaborate to a larger ex-
tent with other top 110 schools, as do schools where
the faculty have earned a larger number of awards.
Again we attribute the greater reach of institutions with
more research dollars, prestige, and awards to greater
resources and talent.
Eqs. (9.2) and (9.4) include an array of new vari-
ables. The fraction of former Ph.D. students placed in
the top 40% of schools in a field is a significant factor
in collaboration. Again top 20% status in a field deters
collaborations with other top 110 schools, perhaps be-
cause of the availability of graduate assistance within
a university-field.
Table 10 is similar to Table 9, except that the depen-
dent variable is the relative share of foreign institutions
in the research of a university-field. For this reason the
Ph.D. placement indicator is the fraction of Ph.D.’swho
have located to top research countries. The role of the
university-field R&D stock per paper is not as strong
in Table 10 as it was before in Table 9, perhaps because
the availability of foreign R&D in part drives the col-
laboration. And yet additional R&Dand private control
do increase the foreign share in (10.1) and (10.2).
The foreign placement indicator contributes
strongly to foreign collaboration. It is of some interest
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Table 10
Determinants of the relative foreign contribution, dependent variable: log(foreign share/(1− foreign share)) (t-statistics in parentheses)




All 12 main fields
1983–1999







Log (stock of federally funded R&D divided by
papers lagged 2 years)
Private university (1, yes; 0, no)
Number of awardsb
Fraction of Ph.D.’s placed in the top 12c
research countries, lagged 2 years
Equipment expenditure/R&D, previous 3 years




































Notes: Estimationmethod is grouped logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, National
Research Council, and authors’ calculations.
a Agriculture and medicine lack data on prizes and awards.
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for a further discussion.
c The top 12 research countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom. See the text for further details.
∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.
∗∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.
to note that the share of equipment expenditures in
the recent past discourages foreign collaboration.
This result suggests the role of the funding motive
(see Section 2) for foreign and other collaborations,
especially in equipment-intensive fields such as
astronomy and experimental physics, which are well
represented in these data (see Figs. 9 and 10 and
Table 6). Foreign collaborations could amortize fixed
costs of expensive equipment across countries in such
fields.
Table 11 repeats the exercise of Tables 9 and 10,
this time using the logarithm of the relative U.S. cor-
porate share in the research of a university-field as the
dependent variable. While the stock of R&D per paper
has rather weak effects on the corporate share, private
control of a university increases U.S. corporate col-
laboration at a high level of statistical significance. In
contrast university-fields that have earned many pres-
tigious awards collaborate less with firms. What these
results suggest to us is that corporate R&D support is
much sought after by private universities. This is true,
except in the case of departments with a strong basic
science focus that tend to win prestigious awards and
extensive federal support. Notice that because firms are
the primary supporters of research collaborations with
universities, it is their R&D that is the likely driver of
collaboration, not the university-field’s R&D.
Also in Table 11, the fraction of former Ph.D.’s
placed in industry strongly drives collaboration with
firms. Recent equipment-intensity also appears to sub-
stitute for firm collaborations, again suggesting the role
of outside research partners in underwriting research
and equipment expense.
Fig. 11 assembles time effects α#t from the regres-
sions in Tables 8–11. These effects hold constant the
sciencefield,R&Dstock, private control dummy,Ph.D.
placements, equipment intensity of R&D, as well as
other variables. For this reason time effects from the
regression tables should lie closer to “pure” effects of
technological change on collaboration than trends in
the raw data. To show what these effects look like,
Fig. 11 graphs the previously omitted regression co-
efficients for time dummies in Eqs. (8.1), (9.1), (10.1),
and (11.1). A comparison of the various line graphs
confirms what we have already seen—that the foreign
share increases more rapidly than the other indicators,
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Table 11
Determinants of the relative U.S. corporate contribution, dependent variable: log(U.S. corporate share/(1− U.S. corporate share)) (t-statistics in
parentheses)




All 12 main fields
1983–1999







Log (stock of federally funded R&D divided by
papers lagged 2 years)
Private university (1, yes; 0, no)
Number of awardsb
Fraction of Ph.D.’s placed in U.S. industry,
lagged 2 years
Equipment expenditure/R&D, previous 3 years




































Notes: Estimationmethod is grouped logit. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, National
Research Council, and authors’ calculations.
a Agriculture and medicine lack data on prizes and awards.
b Awards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National Medal of Technology, Fellow of the
National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for a further discussion.
∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.
∗∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.
and so on. However, there is an interesting jump in late 1980s given various delays that we discuss imme-
the time series of relative shares contributed by foreign diately below.
institutions, U.S. universities, and U.S. firms, which Our hypothesis is that the 1990–1991 jump results
occurs for papers published between 1990 and 1991. from improvements in the National Science Founda-
This jump applies primarily to papers conceived in the tion’s NSFNET from 1987 onward. National Research
Fig. 11. Trends in team size and institutional collaborations, time effects from regression analysis, 1983–1999 (1983 = 0.0).
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Council (1999, Ch. 7) discusses the role of the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) in building a national
“network of networks” during 1986–1991. It is worth
noting that the speed of the NSFNET backbone was an
anemic 56KB/s as of 1986 (National Research Coun-
cil, 1999, p. 78). Only after Merit Computer Network
Incorporated, IBM and MCI were placed under con-
tract to expand NSFNET in 1987 did the speed and
connectivity of NSFNET begin to approach modern
standards (National Research Council, 1999, p. 179).
The pattern of international linkages to NSFNET is
also consistent with this story. Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden connected
in 1988, while Australia, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom connected in 1989 (Mowery and Simcoe,
2002, p. 1376). The domestic expansion of NSFNET,
and slightly later its international expansion were fol-
lowed ultimately in 1994 by the merger of NSFNET
with the commercial internet known as CIX. Noam
(2001, Ch. 3, pp. 63–65) documents the merger and the
disputes that led up to it. The provision to the research
community of a high-speed NSFNET after 1987 and
its interconnectivity to the rest of the research world
after 1988 enabled scientific teams to collaborate more
cheaply and effectively at a distance at precisely this
point in history. The change applies to papers published
in the 1990s and afterwards, especially given construc-
tion lags after 1987, followed by gestation and publica-
tion lags of 2–3years. This interpretation seems reason-
able, especially given that there is no clear jump in team
size in 1990–1991 in Fig. 11: instead, “external” team
workers are replacing “internal” ones. Moreover, the
unfolding of interconnectivity in the early 1990s and
the development of the World Wide Web stimulated
the deployment of the web browser from 1995 going
forward (National Research Council, 1999; Mowery
and Simcoe, 2002). These complementary innovations
helped to sustain the growth of institutional collabo-
ration throughout the 1990s as observed in Fig. 11.
Of course, we do not deny the importance of other
factors driving the growth of institutional collabora-
tions. These include the secular growth of graduate
programs, the growth of Big Science Projects, and the
expansion of science inEurope and Japan.But such fac-
tors account for long-term growth rather than the once-
and-for-all jump in collaboration that one observes in
1990–1991. The most likely candidate for the jump is
the deployment of NSFNET after 1987, a key tech-
nology that lowered the cost of joint research between
teams in different institutions and countries.
The empirical work concludes with Table 12, which
is concerned with the explanation of research “output”
measuredby the sumof fractions of papers and citations
to those papers by a university-field.21 The estimation
method is Ordinary Least Squares. As before, year and
field dummies are included throughout the table and are
highly significant. Eqs. (12.1)–(12.3) use the logarithm
of the fractional number of papers as the dependent
variable, while (12.4) to (12.6) use the logarithm of
fractional 5-year citations. By “fractional” of course,
we mean the sum of the internal paper and citation
fractions within a university-field.
In Eq. (12.1) and the others the coefficient of the
logarithm of the lagged stock of R&D is positive and
highly significant.Consistentwith the analytical frame-
work in Section 2, it is also significantly less than 1.0.
This is also the finding of Adams and Griliches (1998),
who suggest that diminishing returns to the stock of
R&D apply at the university-field level. In (12.1) the
logarithm of all authors per paper decreases the out-
put of fractional papers. However, this result picks up
movement of authorship outside the university-field in
larger teams. The negative sign is spurious. It repre-
sents mismatching of “total” teams with “inside” pa-
pers: larger teams involve more institutional collabo-
ration, a relatively smaller number of “inside” authors,
and thus a smaller number of internal, fractional pa-
pers. To see this, notice that when the fractional num-
ber of authors inside a university-field is used instead,
as in (12.2), the coefficient on the logarithm of authors
reverses and becomes positive and highly significant.
That is, “inside” authors increase “inside” papers.
Eq. (12.3) adds shares of other U.S. universities,
foreign institutions, and U.S. firms to (12.1). Shares
of outside institutions reduce the fractional number of
papers, in part because authorshipmoves away from the
university-field. Another possibility, though, which is
raised by the citation results, is that a quantity–quality
21 Recall that if a university-field contributes half a paper, the frac-
tion assigned is 1/2; if it contributes a third, then the fraction is 1/3,
and so forth (see footnote 7). For present purposes this fractiona-
tion of papers and citations avoids multiple counting of the papers
and citations across universities and limits “output” to the estimated
portion contributed by a university-field.
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Table 12
Determinants of research “output”, dependent variables: log (papers), log (citations over 5 years) (t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable or statistic Log (papers) Log (Citations over 5 years)





Log (stock of federally
funded R&D)
Log (authors per paper)
Log (university-field
authors per paper)
Top 110 U.S. university
share per paper
Foreign share per paper







































































Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Sources for the data are the Institute for Scientific Information, National Science Foundation, National
Research Council, and authors’ calculations. bAwards include the Fields Medal, MacArthur Awards, the National Medal of Science, the National
Medal of Technology, Fellow of the National Academy of Science, and the Nobel Prize. See the text for a further discussion. *Parameter is
significantly different from zero at the 5% level for a one-tailed test.
∗∗ Parameter is significantly different from zero at the 1% level for a one-tailed test.
tradeoff exists in the data. An increase in the foreign
share may genuinely imply that fewer but better papers
are written within a university-field.
If Eqs. (12.1)–(12.3) seem to suggest that collabora-
tion reduces the number of papers for reasons that are
mostly spurious, then (12.4)–(12.6) indicate that insti-
tutional collaboration increases citation and thus total
scientific impact. The counterpart to the spurious neg-
ative effect of all teammembers on fractional papers in
(12.1) is found in (12.4). In that equation the elasticity
of citations with respect to all authors is much smaller
compared with that of “inside” authors in (12.5). In
(12.6) we see that that institutional collaboration in-
creases fractional citations. Overall, the evidence of
Table 12 suggests that the scientific division of labor
increases research “output” as measured by production
and citation influence of a university-field.22 But more
22 This is not a perfect test. Somecitations could involve hidden self-
citations to previous collaborations by the same research team. We
cannot address this upward bias with the data that we have, because
we cannot link names and addresses of researchers, including across
papers.
work is needed to verify this hypothesis, beyond the
evidence in this paper.
7. Discussion and conclusion
This paper has presented evidence on patterns of
research collaboration in U.S. universities over the fi-
nal two decades of the 20th century. The evidence on
the size of scientific teams, as measured by authors per
paper, suggests that specialization and the division of
labor have increased markedly over this period, espe-
cially during the 1990s. Our findings on collaboration
between institutions suggest a similar pattern of de-
velopments, but with some new twists. Collaboration
with foreign universities increases more rapidly over
time than team size, while domestic collaboration in-
creases less rapidly. We take this as evidence that the
location of team members is shifting and is becom-
ing more geographically dispersed, perhaps because of
funding advantages coupled with telecommunications
improvements. However, we lack complete informa-
tion on the causal factors directing this dispersion. It
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seems plausible to say that domestic collaboration has
for a long time been more feasible than international
collaboration, and that only recently havemodern com-
munications technologies made international science
viable for researchers on projects of normal size. This
interpretation receives support fromFigs. 7 and8where
it is the smaller teams that are becoming internation-
alized at a faster rate. But in addition, an increas-
ing emphasis on large databases, as in biology and
medicine, and on massive instrumentation, as in as-
tronomy and physics, may have also played important
roles in these trends towards greater internationaliza-
tion.
The growth of collaboration as observed in this ar-
ticle could be viewed as consistent with the increas-
ing efficiency of the research enterprise. Collaboration
at a distance permits a combination of complemen-
tary capabilities that leads to the execution of more
and hopefully better research. In this way it is likely
welfare-improving. However, a more somber interpre-
tation is that lagging public funding of scientific re-
search in the U.S. compels universities to engage in
institutional collaborations, especially with firms and
foreign institutions, as a substitute means of support.
Additional investigations into the push and pull be-
hind institutional collaboration seem well warranted,
Table A.1
especially given the implications of expanded team-
work for the productive efficiency of scientific re-
search.
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Appendix A. The top 110 U.S. universities
See Table A.1.
The top 110 U.S. universities in the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) database ranked by 1998 federal R&D
University name (rank) 1998 Federal
R&D
University name (rank) 1998 Federal
R&D
expenditures expenditures
Johns Hopkins University (1)
Stanford University (2)
University of Washington-Seattle (3)
University of Michigan, all campuses (4)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (5)
University of California-San Diego (6)
Harvard University (7)
University of Pennsylvania (8)
University of Wisconsin-Madison (9)
University of California-Los Angeles (10)
Columbia University, all campuses (11)
University of Colorado, all campuses (12)
University of California-San Francisco (13)
University of Alabama, all campuses (14)
Yale University (15)
University of Minnesota, all campuses (16)
Cornell University, all campuses (17)






















University of New Mexico, all campuses (57)
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (58)
Oregon State University (59)
Michigan State University (60)
Colorado State University (61)
Yeshiva University (62)
North Carolina State University at Raleigh (63)
University of Maryland at Baltimore (64)
SUNY at Buffalo, all campuses (65)
University of Illinois at Chicago (66)
Oregon Health Sciences University (67)
University of Texas Health Science Center Houston (68)
Rutgers the State University of NJ, all campuses (69)
University of Tennessee, all campuses (70)
Princeton University (71)
University of California-Santa Barbara (72)
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (73)
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Table A.1(Continued)
University name (rank) 1998 Federal University name (rank) 1998 Federal
R&D R&D
expenditures expenditures
Pennsylvania State University, all campuses (20) 186.274 Tufts University (75) 61.167
California Institute of Technology (21) 177.748 University of Kentucky, all campuses (76) 60.760
Duke University (22) 172.532 University of Nebraska, all campuses (77) 58.482
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (23) 171.505 Wayne State University (78) 57.646
University of California-Berkeley (24) 171.135 Wake Forest University (79) 56.705
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (25) 168.871 New Mexico State University, all campuses (80) 56.587
University of Pittsburgh, all campuses (26) 168.511 University of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio (81) 55.004
University of Texas at Austin (27) 165.082 Utah State University (82) 54.903
University of Arizona (28) 161.999 University of Georgia (83) 54.712
Texas A&M University, all campuses (29) 144.938 University of Connecticut, all campuses (84) 53.189
Case Western Reserve University (30) 132.274 Tulane University (85) 52.924
University of Rochester (31) 130.773 Iowa State University (86) 51.196
University of Maryland at College Park (32) 129.198 University of Kansas, all campuses (87) 50.567
Northwestern University (33) 127.911 Florida State University (88) 50.451
University of Chicago (34) 125.982 Virginia Commonwealth University (89) 48.167
Ohio State University, all campuses (35) 124.177 Dartmouth College (90) 45.053
Emory University (36) 118.045 Louisiana State University, all campuses (91) 67.090
University of Iowa (37) 115.312 University of California-Irvine (92) 65.902
University of California-Davis (38) 114.912 Washington State University (93) 44.510
Georgia Institute of Technology, all campuses (39) 113.643 Brown University (94) 44.412
Baylor College of Medicine (40) 110.610 Rockefeller University (95) 43.845
University of Florida (41) 106.510 Arizona State University Main (96) 41.359
Vanderbilt University (42) 106.325 Rice University (97) 34.772
Boston University (43) 104.428 University of Delaware (98) 33.688
University of Miami (44) 101.492 CUNY, all campuses (99) 32.412
New York University (45) 101.426 University of AK Fairbanks, all campuses (100) 31.505
University of Utah (46) 100.722 University of Vermont (101) 31.460
University of Massachusetts, all campuses (47) 100.122 University of California-Santa Cruz (102) 29.849
University of Texas Southwestern Med Center Dal- 97.200 Syracuse University, all campuses (103) 29.200
las (48)
Indiana University, all campuses (49) 95.840 Brandeis University (104) 28.098
Carnegie Mellon University (50) 95.046 University of Oregon (105) 27.041
University of Virginia, all campuses (51) 93.328 University of New Hampshire (106) 25.913
Purdue University, all campuses (52) 92.844 West Virginia University (107) 24.985
SUNY at Stony Brook, all campuses (53) 91.531 University of California-Riverside (108) 22.988
University of Cincinnati, all campuses (54) 90.307 Loyola University of Chicago (109) 17.685
University of Hawaii at Manoa (55) 86.886 Lehigh University (110) 13.019
Notes: Federal R&D is taken from the CASPAR database of the National Science Foundation.
a The data for Johns Hopkins University includes R&D expense for the Applied Physics Laboratory.
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